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Abstract 
Several experiences in international environmental cooperation and assistance are 
examined to understand how communication across differing traditions, legal systems, cultures, 
history, and language has impacted joint efforts to develop stronger environmental regimes. The 
article concludes that efforts to build more effective environmental protection regimes in support 
of both domestic and international environmental goals must become much smarter to overcome 
communication barriers and related impediments to effective joint activities. Different traditions 
can coexist and even work productively together where there is strong and equal motivation on 
both sides. But when these conditions are absent, the international partners need to find 
additional bridging tools and must work explicitly to identify genuinely common goals.  
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Reaching Across the Communication Gulf: Reflections on the 
Challenges of Environmental Assistance Programs 
Ruth Greenspan Bell∗  
Introduction 
International bilateral communication, even between environmental professionals, 
surfaces not only differences in language, but more importantly the different assumptions, 
political cultures, and cultural habits that underpin and interlace language. Anthropologists and 
linguists who study communication say that: "two different languages aren’t just alternative ways 
to talk about the same reality. Alternative languages carry with them a different theory of what 
reality in fact is. A shift from one language to another is a shift between two different worlds,￿ 
where each speaker thinks his/her version is objective, ￿but they are both wrong." 1 This article 
draws from 10 years personal experience in numerous bilateral environmental assistance efforts 
to examine how communication has impeded or facilitated joint efforts to develop stronger 
environmental regimes.  
The sources that provide illustrations include two joint Russian-U.S. efforts: a workshop 
that did not turn out as expected and a joint task force that achieved the narrow goals defined for 
it. These are contrasted with examples from joint work with Polish environmental enforcers and 
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preliminary evidence from ongoing projects in Thailand and in Hungary and Slovenia, all 
countries, which are developing new models of public participation in environmental 
decisionmaking.  
Understanding how environmental professionals communicate is not a theoretical issue or 
concern, but rather an issue with new urgency. Environmental assistance 30 years ago was 
largely an altruistic drive to improve the environments and health of countries of the developing 
world, and the ￿havoc being wreaked￿ in the rivers and forest, soil, and seas.2  As we have 
learned about the inter-connectedness of the globe￿s environment, developed countries now have 
a more selfish motive: how to develop more effective global environmental partners to achieve 
the ambitious goals of the Kyoto Protocol and other international environmental agreements. 
Ultimately, achieving results rests on the success of domestic efforts in each of the signatory 
countries, many of which have historically weak domestic environmental institutions. 3 These 
needs create a direct link and high stakes to the provision of environmental assistance. 
Getting a handle on these issues is not easy and often requires subjective judgments ￿ 
even guesses ￿ about what people are thinking as they interact and communicate within 
assistance efforts. As Michael Agar has pointed out in Language Shock/Understanding the 
Culture of Conversation:4 ￿A piece of discourse can be looked at with different lenses, from 
different angles, from different distances, with different filters over the lens.￿ He goes on to state 
that communication in discourse depends on expectations, and the kinds of frameworks 
participants in discourse build to solve problems will depend on their differing expectations. 
Despite substantial barriers to communication that arise out of language, history, and 
culture, the article concludes that these obstacles can be overcome, and that in any event 
environmental assistance and cooperation efforts are essential if progress is to be made on global 
environmental issues. Nevertheless, particularly when environmental progress requires basic 
changes in political attitudes, progress is likely to be slow, varying from country to country 
                                                 
2 Jeffrey N. Shane, Environmental Law in the Developing Nations of Southeast Asia, in Developing Economies and 
the Environment, The Southeast Asian Experience, edited by Colin MacAndrews & Chia Lin Sien (McGraw-Hill 
Southeast Asia Series (Singapore 1979) at p. 45. 
3 R. Greenspan Bell, "Signing a Climate Treaty is the Easy Part; Implementing and Enforcing Agreed-Upon Actions 
Pose Many Challenges," RFF’s Weathervane web site: http://www.weathervane.rff.org/pop/pop4/bell.html 
December 1997. Reprinted in Green Planet Blues: Environmental Politics from Stockholm to Rio, Geoffrey 
Dabelko, Ken Conca and Michael Alberty. Eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995) 
4 William Morrow and Company, Inc. (New York) 1994 at p. 161 Resources for the Future  Bell 
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depending on each country￿s experience with markets and participatory democracy. In these 
cases, efforts must be viewed as long-term investments. 
Environmental Assistance and How it Works 
Environmental cooperation and assistance efforts work through joint efforts of 
environmental professionals. 5  Generally, these have been lawyer-to-lawyer or engineer-to-
engineer efforts on the apparent assumption that these professionals will be using a relatively 
common language and working toward a jointly held goal. Thus, using Russia as an example, 
environmental economists from the United States find knowledgeable colleagues in Russia to co-
design market-based systems and emissions trading schemes; environment ministries from the 
west collaborate with officials from the state committee for the environment in Russia to build 
stronger environmental institutions for the Russian Federation; Western nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) support Russian NGOs, and so on. Communication is adequate to solve 
specific tasks, for example, to prepare quantitative health risk assessments for highly polluted 
Russian cities. What is more problematic is whether, from an assistance point of view, such 
efforts translate into working programs to reduce pollution.  
The Russian-U.S. Workshop on Public Participation 
In fall 1999, RFF hosted a workshop for the Moscow-based Center for Russian 
Environmental Policy (the Center), a not-for-profit NGO.6 The results of the workshop well 
illustrate the dilemmas that arise when it becomes clear that communication about objectives, 
goals, and means is muddled at best. 
A. Background 
                                                 
5 The funding vehicles include U.S. foreign assistance appropriations acts such as the SEED Act and the Freedom 
Support Act, and funding arranged or provided by the various multilateral assistance organizations such as the 
Global Environment Facility, World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, foundations, and a 
number of individual countries. See Ruth Greenspan Bell, ￿EPA￿s International Assistance Efforts: Developing 
Effective Environmental Institutions and Partners,￿ XXIV Environmental Law Reporter, News & Analysis (October, 
1994) 
6 The Center was founded by Alexey V. Yablokov, a marine biologist, with unusual environmental credentials in 
Russia. Yablokov held official positions in the Yeltsin government, as environmental advisor to the National 
Security Council, but more recently he has been an increasingly outspoken force for environmental reform. He has 
unique stature both within Russia and outside as an honest observer. Resources for the Future  Bell 
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Under the direction of Vladimir M. Zakharov7 the Center undertook an effort to identify 
priorities to reverse the deteriorating environment of the Russian Federation.8 The priorities 
project hoped to influence official decisionmaking from outside government and from the 
perspective of a consensus-based process. Russian, and before that Soviet, policymaking has 
been almost entirely top-down, fashioned by a small group of scientific and technical experts. 
The Russian expert-driven process is efficient ￿ little time is wasted on public process ￿ but 
implementation is a significant problem.  
The Center￿s recommendations contained in their priorities document were also prepared 
by experts, including leading environmental economists, lawyers, educators and psychologists. 
But the Center convened meetings with other Russian NGOs and used opportunities, such as the 
Second All-Russian Congress on Nature Protection and its own bulletin, Towards a Sustainable 
Russia, to distribute and stimulate discussion about drafts of its priority document. The Center 
sought foreign perspective through the comments of U.S. and U.K. experts on various draft 
documents.9 Thus, their process has been more open than, for example, legislative drafting 
efforts of the Russian government, but it is still mainly the product of experts seeking ￿correct￿ 
answers. 
The consensus aspect of the priorities project seemed to be plowing new ground for 
Russia. The workshop was designed to push a little farther into this new territory, by providing 
additional perspectives on consensus and interest group processes, examining how interest group 
interactions work in the United States, and exploring the applicability of these models for the 
Russian context. It tried to ask whether the more intense and sometimes contentious public 
processes in the United States for environmental policy and regulatory development might 
                                                 
7 Zakharov is also a natural scientist by training and is employed in the same research institute as Yablokov. 
8 The already poor quality of the Russian environment has declined during the last ten years of economic and 
political transition. Even the severe Russian economic downturn of the past few years has not produced a net gain 
for the environment. Indicators like male life expectancy show drops from 64 in 1989 to 60 in 1996. Americans who 
have drawn attention to these problems include Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., Ecocide in the USSR, 
New York, Basic Books 1992, and D.J. Peterson, Troubled Lands, The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction, 
Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford, 1993. 
9 The priorities project began at the national level, and moved to a regional level. The results of the national effort 
were discussed at the Second All-Russian Congress for Environmental Protection, which took place in June 1999 in 
the city of Saratov. The prioritization effort receives financial support from a number of U.S. and U.K. foundations 
and assistance organizations, and it builds on the unique networks of the Center outside of Moscow. Resources for the Future  Bell 
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provide some lessons for Russia, in the form of ￿buy in￿ from different interest groups that might 
increase the chances of implementation.  
B. The Case Example 
The workshop was built around a case study demonstrating stakeholder engagement. 
After consultations with Dr. Zakharov, who emphasized the weakness of Russian environmental 
regulation, the decision was made to focus on a largely voluntary program in the Chesapeake 
Bay region to vegetate buffer strips along the shores of the bay and its tributaries. The ￿riparian 
forest buffer￿ program reduces nutrient inflows to the bay and improves habitat quality.  
The case example illustrates how issues were hammered out with disparate interest 
groups and how three jurisdictions ￿ Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, with acknowledged 
differences in their government cultures and attitudes ￿ were able to find constructive ways of 
working together, although they had no formal or legal obligation to do so.  Russian government 
bodies with responsibility for environmental protection historically have had difficulties 
achieving their goals or even communicating with "power" ministries such as those that control 
industry. John Massey Stewart reports that at a Russian national and federation level there is no 
dialogue at all between the politically important Ministries of Finance and Economy and the 
environmental authorities, and that environmental issues are "completely out of sight on the 
agenda." 10 
Half a dozen representatives from various levels of U.S. government and the not-for-
profit sector involved in the establishment of the voluntary buffer program made presentations, 
and Russians were also invited to speak. Russian participants, selected by Dr. Zakharov, 
included scientists, representatives from NGOs and regional and local government agencies, a 
businessman, a lawyer, and elected officials from local legislatures.11  
                                                 
10 John Massey Stewart, Environment: Working With Russia, The Ups and Downs of International Environmental 
Collaboration (Part I), Central European Review, Vol. 1, No. 12 (September 13, 1999) http://www.ce-
review.org/99/12/stewart12.html. Also, "western and Russian respondents [to a survey (respondents are identified in 
parentheses below)] generally felt that State policy failed to adequately address Russia’s environmental problems 
[for reasons including] ’lack of infrastructure and commitment’ (Igor Chestin, World Wildlife Fund, Russian 
Programme Office), ’poor intra- and inter-departmental communication’ (Jane Robertson Vernhes, UNESCO), ’a lot 
of overlapping within the state structures, with no clear delineation of responsibilities’ (Eija Kiiskinen, OECD)..." 
11 Participants were from Moscow, Kaliningrad, Khakasia and Voronezh.  Resources for the Future  Bell 
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Evaluating the workshop, we identified three main ￿ albeit overlapping ￿ areas where 
communication was weak. These are in the process of interchange; assumptions about the 
process of policy formation; and content of policy. 
C. Lessons Learned 
(1) The Process of Interchange/learning Tools and Communication Styles 
Communication can falter over differences in the ways that issues are discussed or in the 
very tools for professional interchange and joint learning. The riparian forest buffer case example 
was chosen as a case study under the assumption that it would facilitate communication about 
stakeholder engagement. But early in the workshop, some participants indicated that they 
thought that RFF was specifically advocating the use of riparian forest buffer zones in Russia or 
was only speaking about how environmental protection takes place in the Chesapeake Bay. 
If at least some of the Russian participants were unfamiliar with the use of case studies, 
they may have come away from the workshop thinking that the message was literally focused on 
the values of buffers in the Chesapeake, and very specifically, how they are implemented. There 
is no way to know whether the entire presentation was fundamentally flawed because it relied on 
an unfamiliar discussion device.  
Communication also floundered around the issue of what the U.S. participants could offer 
the Russians. The Russians seemed to want the U.S. experts to tell them how to solve their 
environmental challenges ￿ what particular technique or plan would ￿work,￿ suggesting a need 
for a technical fix. This emphasis on technical answers has been commented on elsewhere. 
Laurence Mee, former coordinator of the Global Environment Facility’s Black Sea 
Environmental Project, has asked whether Russian priorities "stem from the way of thinking 
which has been in vogue [in Russia and the Soviet Union] for the last fifty years or so, which is 
the technological, "quick-fix" way of thinking."12  
Whatever the reason, the emphasis on process and interest groups was not satisfying for 
the Russians.  Science appeared to them more reliable than the uncertainties of process and 
                                                 
12 John Massey Stewart, Environment: Working With Russia, The Ups and Downs of International Environmental 
Collaboration (Part I). Mee also blamed western aid which "tends to reinforce the idea that everything can be fixed 
with technology, thus undermining efforts to change public attitudes.￿  Resources for the Future  Bell 
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interest group engagement. In contrast, the Americans instinctively distrusted "answers" as 
misleading and contextual, believing that even correctly formulated and researched "answers" ￿ 
including those that have worked in other countries ￿ are worthless if there is no public 
acceptability for adopting them. Indeed, a U.S. colleague with long experience in Russia who 
read this paper in draft asked how assistance could better articulate ￿that the democratic process 
itself is the ￿new technology￿ that is needed￿ in Russia to make rules that people will be willing 
to abide by. Thus, a workshop constructed to demonstrate the values of pragmatism and process 
in resolving environmental problems, not to offer specific prescriptions or programs for 
achieving particular environmental goals, proved something of a non-starter.  
Finally, there is reason to believe that communication on substantive issues was impeded 
by hierarchical relationships within the Russian group. Veteran observers of Eastern Europe and 
Russia have commented on the long Russian tradition of being responsive to hierarchy and 
leaders, a tradition of favors, and a dynamic based on insiders and outsiders.13 Although the 
participants came from several disciplines and different parts of Russia, each had been selected 
for the journey (for some, their first visit to the United States) by Zakharov. In this dynamic, 
Zakharov, himself a very strong personality and one of the strongest English speakers from the 
Russian side, was the clear leader. At several critical junctures, his enthusiasm or lack of interest 
appeared to be very influential. Whether this impeded the receptivity of the Russian participants 
to the issues set out for them by the U.S. hosts is a matter for speculation.14  
(2) How Assumptions about Differences in the Process of Policy Formation Affect 
Communication 
The Russian thirst for answers illustrates a much deeper issue that impacts how 
Americans and Russians interact on environmental policy: differences between the policy 
                                                 
13 Historically, see Marquis de Custine, Letters from Russia (Penguin Books, London, translation published in 
1991). A more contemporary view, but not dissimilar, is in Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion, The Strange 
Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989-1998, a discussion of cliques and networks at Chapter 3; and Jerrold L. 
Schecter, Russian Negotiating Behavior, Continuity and Transition, discussing, for example, the authoritarian 
tradition in Russia, "The role of authority, the avoidance of risk, and the necessity for control are vital to 
understanding Russian negotiating behavior. They provide the context, the background, and the circumstances 
within which the specific issues on the table are negotiated, whether between two bargainers at an open market in 
Moscow or Russian and American diplomats in Geneva." At p. 22.  
14 Perhaps, as a strong English speaker (but not the workshop translator), he was merely a nexus for 
communication, and for expressing Russian points of view. Resources for the Future  Bell 
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formulation processes in the two countries. In contrast to the Russian￿s confidence in 
scientifically derived answers, the Americans on balance thought that solutions inevitably have 
to reflect compromise and what is publicly acceptable, of which science was only one of a set of 
decision factors. The Russian put greater faith in specific formulas and scientifically correct 
answers ￿ preferring a "cook book." These differences formed a communication impasse as 
Russians pushed for answers and Americans resisted.  
Where communication arguably was completely derailed was in the Russian￿s difficulty 
in accepting the basic premise of the workshop: that the public or ￿ more importantly ￿ people 
who did not have academic environmental expertise ￿ non-experts ￿ could play a legitimate role 
in policy formulation. When a U.S. participant said that other factors could be as important as 
science, some of the Russians bristled.15 Many came from a science background, which was a 
basis for their high prestige and privileged access to information that was not available to others 
in Soviet society.  At minimum, this interchange suggested a cultural minefield of sensitivities 
that must be traversed whenever Russians and Americans sit down to compare experiences.  
These assumptions may have played a role when RFF attempted to administer a two-
question survey to the Russian participants. They were asked to rank the importance of legal 
requirements, scientific justification, views of local government, ability to implement, views of 
local public, fairness to other groups, views of local industry, reduction of risk, and cost of action 
in setting environmental requirements. The participants appeared to have a genuinely difficult 
time ranking and the exercise ended in confusion. 
Perhaps the most interesting communication issue involved the art of compromise in the 
policy formation process. Compromise is the core of U.S. decisionmaking. The riparian buffer 
case example displayed compromises between three states; between interest groups; and between 
various levels of federal, state and local governments; all made in order to establish and carry out 
an environmental program to reduce nutrient run off to the Chesapeake Bay.  
The Russians￿ experience with compromise is very different. Neither the Russian nor the 
Soviet attitude toward compromise has the positive halo that surrounds and rewards compromise 
in North America. The Russian word, literally "kompromis", is not a native word. It is not often 
used in Russian and never used in the positive sense of "let’s solve this, so we’ll each 
compromise." A prominent Russian human rights activist has said: 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., D.J. Peterson at p. 209 Resources for the Future  Bell 
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Compromise is a bad word in the Soviet Union ￿[where] ideology reinforced cultural 
traditions. ￿[T]raditionally ￿a person should be ￿ principled, strong, honest. Ideology 
reinforces this with the notion of no compromise with the class enemy. To call something 
a principled, uncompromising position is a compliment.  There is a belief in Russia 
[reinforced by Marxism/Leninism] that there is one Truth, and that you are supposed to 
try and achieve it, not compromise it.16 
In the workshop, some Russians openly expressed disbelief that U.S. government 
officials really hammered out solutions with citizen groups or that U.S. government bodies 
listened as much as they did to the views of citizen groups17  
Compromise and trust are connected issues, and trust is developed ￿ and expressed ￿ in 
different ways in different cultures. The U.S. participants assumed that strangers across the 
environmental spectrum could find ways to sit down and negotiate mutually acceptable 
outcomes. The participants in the riparian forest buffer zone effort came to the table with 
fundamental political and economic differences. Their trust developed in the context of working 
together.  
In contrast, anthropologists say that for Eastern Europeans personal trust is a condition 
precedent to establishing a working relationship, making it difficult to accept that Chesapeake 
participants had cooperated successfully with people of diverse political opinions, lifestyles and 
tastes who they didn’t know at all.18 Janine Wedel has pointed out that "Central and Eastern 
European groups often were unwilling to share information or otherwise cooperate with anyone 
who had not reached the status of personal friend."  
As anthropologist Michael Agar points out, these are differences that are stuck deep 
within communication, within what he calls the ￿languaculture.￿ With these assumptions 
coloring the exchanges in the workshop, it is likely that the fundamental message was lost.  
                                                 
16 Quoted in Smith, Negotiating with the Soviets, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1989 at p. 26 (we found 
the quote in Jerrold L. Schecter, Russian Negotiating Behavior, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998 at p. 32. 
See also Eliza Klose, 12 Surviving Together: A Quarterly on Grassroots Cooperation in Eurasia 2 (Summer 1994). 
17Of course, there is some truth in this observation. Interacting with interest groups takes time and consumes 
resources. But stakeholder processes are so institutionalized in U.S. environmental practice that many now say that 
the public should be brought in when policy recommendations are actually being formulated, not merely to comment 
on already formulated proposals. 
18 Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Compromise: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989-1998, St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998, at p. 111.  Resources for the Future  Bell 
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(3) Content of Policy 
In addition to the issues related to compromise and trust, another area in which 
differences impact communication is in how the content of policy is formulated. Although one 
should be cautious about generalizations, Americans tend to emphasize pragmatism and 
incrementalism in policy change. More often, laws are formulated one by one and refined 
building on experience, and public acceptability; an example of this is the re-authorization 
process in which environmental laws are legislatively revisited on a scheduled basis. 
In contrast, the Center’s priority process reflected a Russian tradition of starting at the 
level of very broad directions. Thus, in its priorities document, the Center identified ambitious 
goals. Many of the Center￿s priorities call for reforms that would certainly improve the prospects 
for environmental gains. But they appear to be far beyond the power and capability of the 
environmental authorities and also represent a sharp reversal from current Russian practice.  
One example is the Center￿s main recommendation, that natural resources and services, 
previously considered a free good in the Soviet Union￿s economic scheme, be assigned high 
values or prices to discourage their use and related impacts such as loss of biodiversity and 
environmental damage. The goal is admirable,19 but from an outsider’s point of view, the Russian 
circumstances do not seem propitious for reaching it. The suggestion marks a massive change 
from the status quo, without any suggestion that there is leadership in Russia that can or is 
willing to pursue this agenda.20 Moreover, insidious Russian corruption in the distribution of 
natural resources in Russia is the ￿gorilla in the closet.￿21  From a U.S. point of view, failure to 
                                                 
19 Although interestingly, the goal suggests that the Russians still believe that some entity rather than the market 
assigns values or prices. 
20 The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of the Russian Federation has always been 
weak. It was downgraded in 1996 to a State Committee on Environmental Protection, and the responsibilities for 
natural resources moved to a separate ministry that was abolished under Putin. John Massey Stewart, Environment: 
Working With Russia, The Ups and Downs of International Environmental Collaboration, footnote 5, quotes Alexey 
Yablakov as saying, " One gets the impression that it [the State Committee on the Environment] is just treading 
water. It adopts a whole load of good programmes on lead, on dioxins - but doesn’t carry them through. Not even a 
quarter of them come to fruition, less than a tenth do." 
21 Corruption is so engrained and accepted that the New York Times reported - as an example of an encouraging 
sign in the appointment of the then- new president of Russia Vladimir Putin - about a ceremonial meeting between 
Putin and the federal Railroads Ministry. In the middle of a meeting, Putin suddenly asked, in an "icy" tone, three 
unexpected questions: why had the railroads "beseeched" the Kremlin for money when certain customers got special 
shipping discounts? Was it not odd that the ministry had granted certain unnamed people the rights to collect a 
mountain of unpaid freight bills? And why was the ministry buying rails from Japan when Russia’s steel mills were 
 Resources for the Future  Bell 
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mention such practicalities or to offer solutions is a fatal flaw for policy recommendations.  
Perhaps Russian traditions of imperial and Soviet decrees encourage a belief in sweeping 
recommendations.22 The important point is how experience in the two systems influences 
starting points and reactions.  
D. Differing Perceptions of Two Workshop Participants 
Two participants, Zakharov from the Russian side and American Eliza Klose, were asked 
to evaluate the interaction.23 Both are bilingual, so they each had the advantage of hearing 
comments and contributions without the filter of translation. Both have extensive experience in 
the other￿s country.24  The contrast in their remarks illustrates some of the difficulties of policy 
exchange. 
Zakharov was frustrated by the emphasis on process. He did not think it was important to 
understand the political and bureaucratic institutions that supported environmental protection in 
the United States, and he viewed environmental protection as more a matter of finding validated 
solutions and inserting them. Thus, he wanted more information about specific "concrete 
measures￿ such as ecological insurance schemes and pollution charges, but not about what might 
motivate people to purchase insurance or the role of the U.S. courts in determining and enforcing 
liability.   
Zakharov expressed a belief that only experts could understand complex environmental 
issues. His view of communication with the public required more emphasis on "simple" ideas, 
because "decisionmakers and the broader public will not understand more intricate and detailed 
approaches."  
                                                                                                                                                             
idle and offering fire-sale prices? (What Putin's Rule Portends for Russia by Michael Wines, January 1, 2000, 
Section 1; p. 6; Column 1) 
22 "￿ Russians have historically relied on government for security, not for justice. Rule in pre-communist Russia 
was by imperial decree, and the tsar’s will was not subject to law." p. 21, Russian Negotiating Behavior Continuity 
and Transition, Jerrold L. Schecter 
23 Both provided comments with the intent that they would be published. 
24 Zakharov has visited the United States and worked with Americans for a number of years. Klose, the Executive 
Director of the Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia (ISAR), lived in Russia for four years and 
continues to work there and in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Resources for the Future  Bell 
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His most surprising comment clearly marked the dimensions of the cultural divide. 
Zakharov thought there should be an emphasis on "new" ideas, principally for tactical reasons ￿- 
essentially environmental decisionmaking as guerilla warfare. 25 ￿Only new ideas and approaches 
can be implemented easily and quickly in Russia. In our heavily entrenched bureaucratic system, 
groups are already organized to stop all those standard ideas that have been tossed about for 
years. New ideas may be more attractive, but most importantly they will not yet have generated 
organized resistance.￿  
Klose saw signs of progress in U.S./Russian environmental interactions ￿- including the 
"real mix" of Russian participants, including some who had been before to the United States 
￿making it easier to concentrate on the substance of the workshop￿ ￿ but identified major 
communication gaps.  For example, the Russian participants had great difficulty believing that 
government agencies and NGOs would work together voluntarily. She quoted a Russian 
participant who asked a representative from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
￿Okay, off the record, would you really work with NGOs if you didn￿t have to?￿  
She noted that only the NGO representative from Kaliningrad, also a member of the local 
duma, or parliament, really seemed to take citizen participation seriously. ￿The scientists in the 
group, though often members of an NGO themselves, saw local NGOs primarily as protestors, 
not constructive participants.￿ 
Klose also noted with concern the Russian participants￿ emphasis on learning how to gain 
greater access to Western resources, and their seeming belief that attracting money and other 
resources was more critical to addressing environmental problems than attracting public support. 
Finally, she thought Russian attitudes might be too entrenched to absorb the lessons of the 
workshop: ￿As I listened and acknowledged the deep differences, I ￿ regretted ￿ that the 
Soviet legacy of mistrust of and condescension toward the average citizen so clearly limits￿ 
Russian consideration of the benefits of public participation.  
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The Russian-U.S. Legal Task Force 
Under the Freedom Support Act, EPA established a Russian-U.S. task force, hoping to 
stimulate a different and more practical way of thinking about environmental law in Russia.26 
Russian environmental law drafting was understood to be a somewhat academic exercise handled 
by scholars extremely knowledgeable about environmental laws in the west. Because of the 
nature of Russian environmental practice, however, their responsibilities largely ended when 
drafting was completed. There was no environmental bar and environmental practitioners were 
largely the prosecutors who brought criminal enforcement actions. 
Recognizing the many skilled Russian environmental law drafters and the significant 
gaps in environmental law implementation, EPA established a legal task force designed to draw 
Russian lawyers more actively into the process of environmental regulation, by encouraging 
them to analyze and address specific proposed regulatory activities in the context of Russian 
laws. The task force served as a kind of legal counsel for two EPA-sponsored, Agency for 
International Development-funded environmental assistance projects in Russia: the Volgograd 
air quality project and a water quality project based in the Tver region, north of Moscow. 
Through this effort, EPA hoped to introduce a more concrete basis for the job of environmental 
law drafting, and to develop a wider cadre of environmental law practitioners.  
The task force was predicated on practical problem solving: hearing the goals of the 
clients, researching the applicable Russian environmental law, and developing a legal framework 
through which the clients could achieve their goals. Thus, the task force was meant as a ￿roll up 
your sleeves,￿ problem solving kind of experience, not a forum for speeches or formal 
presentations.  
As it tried to establish the requisite informality, the task force encountered a major 
obstacle. This was about differing understandings of how senior Russian experts worked in 
settings such as ours. For example, in the first Moscow meeting, a senior environmental law 
specialist insisted on making a major presentation to the assembled group. After extended 
internal discussions, the EPA personnel decided that he was an essential person if the effort were 
to succeed, and provided a limited time for his presentation. His presentation was a relatively 
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formal and somewhat abstract exposition on Russian water law, which only touched tangentially 
on the particular issues before the task force. But at the end of the presentation, the specialist 
plunged into the task force format, brainstorming and providing suggestions that were added to 
others on a flip chart. We could only surmise that his intense interest in making the presentation 
was somehow related to sensitivity about his senior status. 
A point of unexpected Russian sensitivity came up when EPA introduced the law drafters 
to one of the specific tasks before the task force. After extensive consultation, the Volgograd 
￿client￿ (EPA and Volgograd air enforcement specialists) had decided to concentrate its efforts 
on introducing ￿visible emissions￿ testing (otherwise known as ￿smoke reading￿) into Volgograd 
enforcement practices. Smoke reading avoids the need for in-plant entries and reduces the need 
for monitoring equipment and for internal plant inspections. Typically Russian inspectors must 
announce their intent to inspect a plant before being allowed to enter, thus it is harder to catch 
illegal behavior. Smoke reading can be done from outside the plant, by inspectors who are 
properly trained to ￿read￿ smoke emissions and to bring enforcement actions on this basis. 
Moreover, anyone ￿ official employees of the inspectorate, NGOs, and other community 
members ￿ can be trained to stand outside the plant and read smoke emissions. 
Immediately as the goals of the client were described, one very senior, distinguished 
Russian environmental law drafter became visibly disturbed. His concerns had to be coaxed out 
of him, but clearly demonstrated why he was annoyed. He described smoke reading as a 
technique that had been developed in the United Kingdom in the 1950s and strongly suggested 
his view that this was an outdated technology, discarded in the west, and presumably foisted on 
Russia by an arrogant and condescending United States. His remarks displayed a cultural 
sensitivity as well as his extensive academic knowledge of the environmental laws of the west. 
The situation was saved by the intervention of a senior EPA air engineer, who was able 
authoritatively to say that smoke reading is used routinely in the United States as the basis of 60-
70% of air enforcement cases brought in the western United States.   
Another more easily anticipated legal-culture issue came up in the context of Russian 
evidentiary rules. A major effort of the task force was centered on how smoke reading might 
work in the context of evidentiary rules governing enforcement actions in Russia. The Russian 
rules of evidence require a great deal more corroboration of violations in a court action than do 
the rules of the U.S. system, displaying a deep-rooted Russian concern about the fairness of 
Russian enforcement bodies.  A considerable part of the legal research of the task force was 
directed to finding appropriate Russian law solutions to this problem.  Resources for the Future  Bell 
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An important tool that the task force used to identify and surface differences in culture 
and communication was to use two facilitators in meetings. One was an American with a strong 
international and environmental background; the other was a bilingual Russian, who fortunately 
had been an environmental law expert before she became one of the first in Russia with formal 
facilitation and conflict management skills. The job of each in meetings was to be a ￿third ear,￿ 
listening carefully for communication lapses. Although expensive, this proved to be the best 
possible investment in assuring that the ￿languaculture￿ did not trip us up. 
Communication improved over the course of the project, but it is difficult to say what 
lasting results were left. The task force achieved a narrow purpose ￿ it provided legal research to 
the client projects that enabled those projects to achieve their goals within the constraints of the 
Russian legal system. But EPA was interested in a more ambitious goal ￿ changing attitudes. 
Regarding this goal, there is one anecdote to report. The senior environmental specialist who 
insisted on making a formal presentation was part of a Russian delegation to a workshop held in 
the U.S. several years later. In his remarks in the U.S. workshop, the specialist emphasized that 
perfectly drafted laws were useless if they were not capable of implementation. Unfortunately, 
this important insight comes in the context of a Russia in which environmental laws have even 
less importance than they did in the early 1990s.27 
U.S.–Polish Cooperative Effort to Create Flexible Environmental Compliance 
Mechanisms  
A joint U.S.-Polish effort illustrates a situation in which there was either a greater 
meeting of the minds between project participants or, because of the in-country motivation for 
change, communication was adequate. The assistance could be deemed a success because it 
resulted in change, although the path toward change had many unexpected twists and turns. 
In 1992, EPA and the Polish environmental agency established a cooperative effort to 
reform Poland￿s compliance and enforcement system.28 Early in the effort, the Polish team, 
which consisted of environmental enforcement officials and lawyers from the national and the 
district (voivodship) level, came to the United States for an EPA-organized study tour. The level 
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28 Details about this project are found in Ruth Greenspan Bell and Susan E. Bromm, ￿Lessons Learned in the 
Transfer of U.S.-Generated Environmental Compliance Tools: Compliance Schedules for Poland,￿ XXVII 
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of Polish commitment is demonstrated by the fact that the time and transportation of the Polish 
team were supported by Polish government funds.  
What distinguished the Polish effort from the Russian workshop was that the Polish team 
swiftly developed its own mission and over time used the opportunities for its own purposes. 
After learning about how enforcement officials in the United States use flexible compliance 
instruments, the Polish enforcement officials wanted to see whether Polish versions could be 
constructed, consistent with their own legal traditions and challenges.29 In doing so, they 
assumed that Polish environmental regulation and enforcement was moving from the theoretical 
to something real.30 Although the team had a strong and quite determined leader, the members of 
the team appeared to have been selected for their specific contributions to the project, rather than 
for political or social reasons, although they also seemed to be well-acquainted with each other.  
Thus, the U.S. team organized the meetings for the study tour, and prepared U.S. 
national, state, and local government officials so that they would understand what the Poles 
wanted to learn. But the Polish team and its experts came armed with specific questions. Each 
evening that they were in the United States, the Polish team caucused to discuss what they had 
learned that day, and to work together to write a proposal for action in Poland. When they left the 
United States, they carried a draft document. 
In the beginning, there was a sense that the U.S. team was steering the project, largely 
based on its greater expertise in environmental enforcement and compliance. As the project 
developed, however, the U.S. team￿s role subtly shifted, becoming, de facto, advisors to the 
project who were brought in to answer specific questions, to provide targeted training, or, as 
detailed below, to facilitate access to specific Polish interest groups. Increasingly, 
communication was dictated by Polish needs. For example, the Polish team hired a legal team 
from a Łodz university to examine and make recommendations on how flexible compliance 
negotiations could be made to work in the Polish civil law system. 
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The Polish attitudes toward public information and public outreach were also distinctly 
different than the Russian attitude. In part, this difference reflected a longer-term effort, 
compared to the partnership between RFF and the Russian Center, which spanned only two years 
and infrequent contact. The U.S.-Polish situation allowed time for attitudes on both sides to 
evolve as insights grew. Over time, the Polish team developed an understanding of the need to 
develop public and interest group support in Poland for the proposed changes. About the mid-
point of the 6-year project, the U.S. team began to see that an increasing amount of its time in 
Poland was scheduled with meetings with important interest groups ￿ meetings that were set up 
by the Polish team. In one visit, for example, the EPA team was brought to meetings with newly-
developed trade associations convened at the Ministry of Industry; the chair of the Polish 
Parliament￿s Ecological Committee; officials from district environmental enforcement bodies; 
officials ￿ particularly the skeptical legal staff ￿ from within the Environment Ministry; and 
representatives from various environmental NGOs, comparable to the U.S. public interest groups 
who play an important role in environmental decisionmaking.  
In the first of these meetings, the Polish environmental NGOs seemed to find the 
situation awkward and unfamiliar; they had little experience meeting with government officials 
about proposed legislation. There was a marked change over the years of the project, with 
increasingly confident and less diffident NGO members, and increasingly engaged public 
officials who understood why they needed support for the massive changes they were 
recommending. 
A more subtle issue was suggested by the way our principal Polish counterpart, someone 
high in the ranks of the Polish environmental enforcement agency, would introduce the U.S. 
team in meetings as advisors and as a resource. He was extremely careful to make it clear that 
the Polish team was not interested in directly incorporating U.S. solutions into a European 
situation. Clearly, although it was never articulated, he was dealing with ￿ perhaps preempting ￿ 
Polish sensitivity to U.S. environmental hegemony, and possibly also implicitly underlining the 
Polish goal of joining the European Union.  
The U.S. team also lost track of the project from time to time. Despite a commitment to 
stay in contact and telephone conference calls, there would be unexplained periods of silence on 
the Polish side. It began to be clear inferentially that some of these silences came in periods in 
which political or personnel changes in the Polish government required the Polish partners to 
build new constituencies for their new ideas.  Resources for the Future  Bell 
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Although some cultural and institutional issues may have been buried or implied or were 
overtaken by the momentum of the project, some were explicitly surfaced for discussion and 
resolution.31 It was necessary to craft compliance tools so that they could work in Poland￿s 
continental European civil law system. The common reference point for the U.S. and Polish 
teams was an understanding that Poland was quickly moving back to a law-based society, 
something the U.S. team could easily understand. But the legal traditions of the two countries are 
very different and required considerable mutual understanding in order for the two teams to work 
together toward a common goal. It was also important for the U.S. team to understand Polish 
concern about the specific ways in which regulatory discretion has fertilized corruption, 
particularly in the communist period, and to help them find ways to bound behavior. Once 
understood, solutions from the perspective of U.S. practice could be offered. In this sense, there 
were great similarities between the legal-culture issues surfaced in this project and in the Russian 
legal task force.  
By 1998, responsibility for the project had shifted entirely into Polish hands; the U.S. role 
was principally directed to conduct a train-the-trainer course in compliance negotiations. An 
indicator of project success came in the form of a May 7, 1998 report from Reuters. Teresa 
Warchalowska, the Chief Polish environmental inspector, announced that Polish environmental 
authorities were launching a scheme, developed with the EPA, to help firms get off an 
embarrassing list of the country’s worst polluters by agreeing to an adjustment program that 
would bring the firms into environmental compliance. Polish provincial governors signed four 
pilot negotiated agreements, and sent letters to other facilities on the list of 80 worst violators in 
Poland inviting them to consider participating in the Compliance Abatement Period process 
based on the success of the initial four pilots. Legal changes to the Polish environmental law to 
allow negotiations of control plans and compliance schedules had advanced as far as inter-
ministry review.32 
It would be nice to end on this high point, but afterward, doubt was raised about the 
viability of the effort. The Polish champion for flexible compliance tools was moved from his 
position in the Inspectorate to a different position in the Environment Ministry, and the project 
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lost its strong champion. The U.S. team has heard that the results of the project have been picked 
up at the voivoda level, and the national level is quiet. Once again, silence is a veil. 
Developing Institutions to Support Public Participation in Thailand and in 
Hungary and Slovenia  
Two efforts currently underway are designed to work with country partners to develop 
better mechanisms for public participation and transparency in environmental governance. A 
joint project in Thailand with Thai counterparts will develop and examine case studies to help 
provide a roadmap for better processes for public involvement in environmental decisionmaking.  
The second, in partnership with two Central European countries, Hungary and Slovenia, will 
develop institutions to implement government commitments to increasing public access to 
environmental information in the hands of government, thereby increasing government 
transparency and strengthening public participation in environmental decisionmaking. 
While both projects are in their early stages, and it is too early to say whether the efforts 
will fall closer to the Russian or the Polish example, a couple of interesting points can be made.  
The Thai project began at the initiative of Thai researchers, who are responding to an 
opportunity embedded in the 1997 Thai constitution opening the door to greater public 
involvement in government decisionmaking. Thus, the U.S. role appears to be seen from the 
beginning principally as a resource, a way to gain comparative perspective from U.S. experience 
and access to experience in the countries in economic and political transition.  
The first activity was a workshop in Bangkok, held in Thai, in which Thai experts 
presented their research and assessment about current practices and deficiencies in Thailand. 
U.S. experts presented four papers, three of which provided background on U.S. practices and on 
the rationale for public participation. The fourth international paper presented lessons from 
specific public participation efforts in India.33 Although the presentations were somewhat formal, 
a microphone on the floor of the meeting room facilitated questions and statements from the 
numerous NGOs, academics, government officials, assistance bodies, and others attending the 
workshop, who expressed opinions and views. Thus, Thai concerns were front and center.  
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The second phase is under development, but will involve case studies designed to 
examine existing practices and develop options for change. The results are expected to be 
influential in the ongoing policy reform process in Thailand because communication with 
decisionmakers has been part from the beginning. 
The Hungarian/Slovenian effort began at the initiative of two U.S. institutions (RFF and 
NYU Law School) and the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe. It 
builds on two commitments by Hungary and Slovenia: their participation in the Aarhus 
Convention, and even more importantly, their strong desire to join the European Union. The 
Aarhus Convention is a UN-ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters that established principles for 
public access to environmental information and public participation in environmental 
decisionmaking. Thus, the project starts with considerable ￿buy-in￿ and internal motivation.  
The first in-region meetings were organized by the consortium, and discussions were 
guided by commissioned research on existing laws and practices. The meetings were conducted 
in English ￿ a common language for Hungarians and Slovenians ￿ which made it easier for U.S. 
participation, but more difficult for regional facility. Symbolically (but not necessarily 
anticipated by the organizing institutions), the momentum of the meeting shifted on the afternoon 
of the second day of in-region meetings, when each country held its own ￿native language￿ 
meetings to discuss a plan of action.  After sessions, each group came back with detailed country 
plans, memorialized on flip charts. These will essentially guide the future progress of the project.  
These experiences, in which ownership of the projects is in the countries where change is 
being planned, seem to bode well for the success of both projects.  
Lessons for Future Environmental Assistance Efforts 
Are the real differences between environmental professionals so great that we should 
abandon environmental assistance and cooperation with countries with very different traditions?  
The snapshots in this paper suggest that different traditions can coexist and even work 
productively together if the motivation on both sides is more or less equal. This does not mean 
identical motivations, but a truly bi-lateral relationship. In the most motivated situations, there 
will also be adequate motivation to understand how the other side is thinking.  
Where motivation does not exist, additional tools to bridge communication must be 
added, and there must be some sort of explicit effort to identify genuinely common goals. Resources for the Future  Bell 
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Assistance that simply throws professionals from different cultures together without helping 
them understand the context in which each functions is less likely to effect change.  
Clearly, there must be greater recognition that environmental specialists work within the 
confines of institutions, cultures, traditions, legal systems, and language, and that few technical 
fixes work independent of the social and political context.34 One step toward mastering this 
situation is to be more specific about what it takes to really work together.  
When the ￿languaculture￿ issue is confronted head-on, specialists can be added to the 
assistance team to fill these gaps. The effectiveness of dialogue can be increased by broadening 
beyond professionals only in the environment field to include other specialists in 
communication. Bicultural/bilingual facilitators can provide the "third ear" that listens for 
communication failures, whether linguistic, political, or social.  
Continued contacts and exposure, rather than "one-off" assistance relationships also help. 
Beyond developing relationships of personal trust over time, the friendships that develop allow a 
different level of communication and understanding. A strong local partner is a good start, but by 
no means a panacea. The ideal situation is to actually experience conditions in the partner 
country by living there in non-optimal conditions, using the local phones and shopping in the 
local stores to understand how local institutions work in reality. When this is not possible, it is 
possible to learn something about these issues, but it requires looking beyond the technical 
environmental literature. Any effort like this requires a long-term commitment from all parties 
and the recognition that what is involved is joint learning. 
Increasing awareness of the many activities that countries undertake within their own 
borders that impact the global environment demands concerted action. But effective international 
agreements require more adept local environmental protection institutions. Assistance to build 
these institutions must become much smarter in order to overcome the differences in 
￿languaculture￿ that create communication barriers and impediments to effective joint activities. 
The effort to strengthen environmental action around the world is very similar to the subject of 
strengthening human rights. Both are powerful and universal ideas. But in both cases, the people 
who do this work are planting seeds that may take long and uncertain periods to germinate. 
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